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socio-economic changes in Africa have increased pressure on the continent’s ecosystems. Most 
research investigating environmental change has focused on the changing status of specific species or 
communities and protected areas, but has largely neglected the broad-scale socio-economic conditions 
underlying environmental degradation. We tested national-scale hypotheses regarding the socio-
economic predictors of ecosystem change and degradation across Africa, hypothesizing that human 
density and economic development increase the likelihood of cumulative environmental damage. 
Our combined environmental performance rank includes national ecological footprint, proportional 
species threat, recent deforestation, freshwater removal, livestock density, cropland coverage, and 
per capita emissions. Countries like Central African Republic, Botswana, Namibia, and Congo have the 
best relative environmental performance overall. Structural equation models indicate that increasing 
population density and overall economic activity (per capita gross domestic product corrected for 
purchasing-power parity) are the most strongly correlated with greater environmental degradation, 
while greater wealth inequality (Gini index) correlates with better environmental performance. 
This represents the first Africa-scale assessment of the socio-economic correlates of environmental 
degradation, and suggests that dedicated family planning to reduce population growth, and economic 
development that limits agricultural expansion (cf. intensification) are needed to support environmental 
sustainability.
Africa is the only continent to have passed through the late-Pleistocene/early-Holocene megafauna extinction 
pulse relatively intact compared to most other continents1, although many megafauna extinctions still occurred 
there in the mid-Pleistocene2 and later3. This means that today, Africa is the last global refugium of a functionally 
intact assemblage of large herbivores, carnivores, and scavengers4, and it boasts the world’s highest mammal 
alpha diversity5. However, although much of the African continent experienced some later environmental change 
during its colonial period6, many of its natural resources have only recently (i.e., last few decades) been exposed 
to broad-scale exploitation compared to other regions of the world7,8. In addition, the African continent has the 
greatest projected growth in human population size over the next century, and is set to achieve some of the world’s 
highest human densities by 21009 — the entire continent is home to over 1.2 billion people today and is projected 
to increase by between five- and seven-fold to nearly six billion by the end of the century based on current fertility 
rates9. Further, Africa’s relatively slow rate of fertility decline (about one third of Latin America’s and Asia’s trajec-
tories since the 1950s), which in some countries is even stabilizing10, means that there is little prospect to avoid 
this projected growth in the human population.
Globally, ongoing species extinctions, the rising threat risk across all major taxonomic groups, and the declin-
ing abundance of biodiversity globally11 — over the last half century in particular12 — have arisen primarily 
from massive human modification of the biosphere13. The principal drivers of these population and species 
extinctions are clear14: habitat conversion15 — much of it from agricultural expansion7, road development16, 
over-exploitation15, pollution17, urbanization18,19, climate disruption20, and the synergies among these21. But 
these proximate drivers sometimes belie the ultimate driver of them all — human population expansion (both 
numerical and geographical) and the consumption of Earth’s resources this implies9. Indeed globally, human 
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population density predicts the number of threatened species among nations22–24, so the inexorable growth of the 
global human population from 7.5 billion to possibly over 12 billion by the end of the century9 will undoubtedly 
exacerbate the extinction risk of many species.
However, the direct evidence for the negative effects of human population size, density, and growth on bio-
diversity is often equivocal, or at least confounded with other conditions. For example, there is only a weak cor-
relation globally between human population density and species extinctions because of the spatial congruence 
between human population size and species richness, a lack of data on extinctions, and the variability across 
methods25. However, there is evidence that current human population densities and growth rates are higher in 
Biodiversity Hotspots (i.e., where the greatest potential species loss occurs) than elsewhere26,27, and there is also a 
positive historical relationship between human population size and threats to biodiversity at national scales28,29. 
While the highest recent mammal extinctions in Africa overall did not correspond with the highest human pop-
ulation densities, the absolute number of extinctions in southern Africa coincided with high human population 
densities30. In Europe, there is a century-scale time lag between increasing human population density and current 
biodiversity threat31. Furthermore, 50% of tropical protected areas are experiencing biodiversity loss because 
of high human population growth and locally or foreign-driven consumption at their edges32. For these same 
protected areas, human population size is also negatively correlated with a protected area’s biodiversity ‘health’33.
Of course, human population size is only part of the equation with respect to predicting environmental degra-
dation, because consumption rates add to and interact with population size34, albeit in different ways depending 
on the wealth and culture of the human population in question35,36. Indeed, previous work suggests that variation 
in environmental degradation at a national scale is best described by a country’s accumulated ‘wealth’ as meas-
ured by gross measures of economic turnover (e.g., gross national income and gross domestic product), with 
a country’s population size inextricably linked to the magnitude of its economy37. However, that global study 
perhaps unjustly penalized those countries where most broad-scale environmental degradation had happened 
recently37. Therefore, a more regional analysis of national environmental performance focussing on African coun-
tries with more similar histories, cultures, economies, and ecosystems might provide additional insights into the 
relationships and interactions among economics, human population trends, and the overall state of a nation’s 
environment.
Given increasing exploitation and the rapid growth of its human population, Africa stands to lose many 
more of its already threatened species and ecosystems over the coming decades, especially as legal and illegal 
overseas demand (especially from China) for timber, minerals, fuels, agricultural, seafood, and wildlife prod-
ucts increases7,8,38,39. Civil unrest40, a recent history of poor governance and corruption in many states41, a rising 
prevalence of organized crime42,43, and extensive (but diminishing) poverty44 threaten to exacerbate Africa’s envi-
ronmental situation further. But which African states are doing better than their peers in environmental custodi-
anship and performance? As pressures on the environment grow, a quantitative index of relative environmental 
performance among African nations is now needed to quantify the relative contribution the socio-economic, 
demographic, and industrial drivers of environmental degradation, and more importantly, to highlight which 
countries have performed better at resisting the loss of their biodiversity.
In this paper, we combine several national-scale metrics of environmental performance (ecological footprint, 
megafauna conservation index, species threat, freshwater removals, forest loss, livestock density, cropland extent, 
greenhouse-gas emissions) for mainland Africa countries (including Madagascar, but excluding small-island 
nations because the latter tend to be outliers for metrics expressed per area or per capita) to construct a relative 
environmental performance indicator specific to Africa. This approach avoids the unfair comparison of environ-
mental performance in African nations against non-African states. We then examine the correlation between 
environmental rank and the following socio-economic indicators as possible explanatory drivers for the variation 
observed using structural equation models: (i) human population density, (ii) wealth (gross domestic product), 
(iii) wealth distribution (Gini index), (iv) governance quality, and (v) commitment to environmental protection 
(through the establishment of dedicated protected areas). Our hypotheses are that environmental performance 
of a nation declines as its population density25, wealth37, and wealth disparity45 increase, and as its governance 
quality46,47 and area under protection33 declines.
Results
A non-parametric (Kendall’s τ) correlation matrix among the component environmental metrics demonstrated 
only weak or moderate (most τ ≤ |0.385|) relationships among variables (Table 1), so we elected to keep all 
hypothesized correlates in the saturated (i.e., including all hypothesized correlates) structural equation model. 
However, there was a reasonably strong correlation (−0.523) between freshwater removal and forest loss among 
countries — a lack of an obvious mechanistic link between the two suggests that neither can be excluded (Table 1). 
After calculating the geometric mean rank of countries for which there were at least seven component environ-
mental variables, the top five countries for best environmental performance were (in order) Central African 
Republic, Botswana, Namibia, Congo, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Table 2; Fig. 1). The five worst envi-
ronmental performers (in order of worst to less bad) were: Morocco, Algeria, Swaziland, South Africa, and Ghana 
(Table 2).
We also tested the sensitivity of the final structural equation model results to variation in the minimum num-
ber of environmental indices used to construct the composite environmental performance index. Including all 8 
environmental indices (ecological footprint48, megafauna conservation index49, relative species threat; freshwater 
removals; recent proportional forest loss50, livestock per hectare of arable land, extent of permanent croplands, 
greenhouse-gas emissions in 2013) reduced the number of countries in the ranking from 48 (Table 2) to 41 
(Table 3).
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Structural equation models. According to the thirteen structural equation models (Table 3; Fig. 2), 
the strongest predictor (i.e., appearing the most often in highest-ranked and highest goodness-of-fit mod-
els) of the composite environmental rank among African countries was population density (Table 3; see also 
Supplementary Information Methods and Results Section 3, Fig. S1 and Tables S3–S5, and Section 11, Fig. S5 
for results from general linear mixed-effects models and boosted regression trees, respectively; these alterna-
tive modelling approaches takes either potential spatial autocorrelation or continuous responses into account, 
respectively), such that environmental performance (smaller rank) increased as a country’s population density 
decreased (Fig. 3a). While the top-ranked models with sufficient goodness-of-fit indicated that the land area 
under protection, wealth (GDP), and wealth disparity explained some additional variation in environmental rank 
(Table 4), the single-parameter explanatory models for these variables indicated weak relationships (Table 4; see 
also Supplementary Information Methods and Results Section 3, Tables S3–S5). Nonetheless, environmental rank 
improved to some extent as the proportion of the land area under protection increased (Fig. 3b), and it decreased 
as wealth distribution become more even (Fig. 3c) and per-capita GDP (wealth) increased. Re-running the struc-
tural equation models using the original configuration of the environmental performance index, but requiring 
all eight environmental variables in the calculation of the environmental performance rank (from Table 3), there 
was a slight shift in the top-ranked model (Table 5), but overall the main conclusions were still supported. This 
analysis resulted in 34 countries (cf. 38 countries for the less-stringent criterion of 7 of 8) environmental variables 
being considered (Table 5).
Discussion
It is simultaneously telling and disconcerting that none of the Sustainable Development Goal targets, nor any 
of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, mentions reducing human population size as a pathway to achieving their 
goals, even though the United Nations promotes family planning as a means to empower people and develop 
nations51. Our finding that the strongest predictor of environmental performance among nations in Africa is 
population density means that countries with the most people per unit area suffered relatively more environ-
mental degradation on average. This result brings into question the reality of the United Nations’ Sustainability 
Development Goals (www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment) — particularly Goal 15 (‘Sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss’), as well as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Aichi Biodiversity Targets (www.cbd.int/sp/targets) Strategic Goals A (‘Address the underly-
ing causes of biodiversity loss by mainstreaming biodiversity across government and society’) and B (‘Reduce the 
direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustainable use’) — without dedicated, well-funded, and large-scale 
family planning rolled out across the African continent. Indeed, the targets for human development are becom-
ing increasingly connected with those for natural systems and biodiversity52, and so we concur that the “… next 
generation of [human development and policy] scenarios should explore alternative pathways to reach these 
intertwined targets, including potential synergies and trade-offs between nature conservation and other devel-
opment goals”52.
Combined with the stagnation of natural fertility decline in Africa compared to other developing regions of 
the world10, there has therefore never before been a more important time to re-invigorate the need for long-term, 
culturally sensitive, and meaningful family-planning measures if many African nations are to have any hope of 
stemming the decline of their biodiversity. This is particularly urgent for countries such as Nigeria (~187 million 
inhabitants in 2016; fertility = 5.5/woman; exponential rate of increase 2000–2015 = r2000−15 = 0.39), Democratic 
Republic of Congo (~80 million; fertility = 6.5/woman; r2000−15 = 0.48), South Africa (~56 million; fertility = 2.4/
woman; r2000−15 = 0.22), Tanzania (~54 million; fertility = 5.2/woman; r2000−15 = 0.45), Kenya (~45 million; fertil-
ity = 3.9/woman; r2000−15 = 0.39), and Ghana (~28 million; fertility = 4.2/woman; r2000−15 = 0.38) (see also Fig. 1).
Fertility rates particularly in sub-Saharan Africa remain high, in part due to high poverty, low education53, 
and high child mortality10, thus resulting in a desire for large family sizes54. In Western Africa in particular, the 
adoption of contraception has been slow due to pervasive attitudinal resistance55, even though there is still con-
siderable unmet demand56,57. As such, many national governments in Africa have not prioritised family-planning 
programs54; yet, well-designed family planning with regionally and culturally specific approaches (e.g., traditional 
EF MCI THR FWR FRL LVS CPL
MCI 0.341
THR 0.159 0.249
FWR 0.336 0.190 0.238
FRL −0.356 −0.246 −0.064 −0.523
LVS −0.145 −0.066 0.050 0.076 −0.132
CPL −0.110 −0.036 0.244 −0.108 0.303 0.276
EMI 0.385 0.131 0.149 0.233 −0.187 −0.161 −0.018
Table 1. Correlation (Kendall’s τ) matrix of environmental component variable ranks. EF = ecological 
footprint48; MCI = megafauna conservation index49; THR = relative species threat (number of IUCN Red List 
species classified as Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, or Near Threatened divided by total number 
of species assessed; iucnredlist.org); FWR = freshwater removals (percent of internal resources; data.worldbank.
org); FRL = recent (2000 to 2012) proportional forest loss50; LVS = livestock (cattle, pigs, buffaloes, sheep, and 
goats per hectare of arable land; fao.org/faostat); CPL = extent of permanent croplands (percent of total land 
area; data.worldbank.org); EMI = greenhouse-gas emissions (CO2-e per capita in 2013; data.worldbank.org).
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Country ISO
environmental component variable ranks
ENVgmEF MCI THR FWR FRL LVS CPL EMI
Cent Afr Rep CAF 18 5 1 2 25 44 11 6 7.754
Botswana BWA 44 1 4 31 10 7 1 42 7.955
Namibia NAM NA 2 18 24 12 5 3 38 9.276
Congo COG 20 20 9 1 27 2 14 31 9.790
Dem Rep Congo COD 3 33 23 5 43 10 21 2 10.943
Eritrea ERI 1 34 45 37 4 27 4 NA 11.363
Zambia ZMB 8 6 8 18 39 11 7 21 12.020
Chad TCD 31 23 11 26 19 13 5 3 12.876
Burundi BDI 2 22 22 21 24 43 45 1 13.240
Mozambique MOZ 5 10 38 12 46 4 20 15 13.724
Angola AGO 6 17 12 10 38 7 15 39 14.454
Gabon GAB NA 30 17 6 23 3 24 44 15.581
Mali MLI 30 29 5 34 16 30 10 5 15.623
Zimbabwe ZWE 17 4 6 39 29 17 16 36 16.102
Rwanda RWA 7 7 21 16 22 47 42 7 16.309
Niger NER 32 26 15 38 6 24.5 9 9 16.557
Somalia SOM 24 44 40 43 11 20 6 4 17.690
Lesotho LSO 34 32 16 11 4 32 12 37 17.972
Malawi MWI 4 9 37 32 33 35.5 30 8 18.190
Eq Guinea GNQ NA 28 20 4 34 7 32 46 18.650
Mauritania MRT 42 46 27 46 7 15 2 33 18.950
Togo TGO 13 12 10 15 35 33 36 26 19.970
Liberia LBR 16 41 33 3 48 14 31 20 20.139
Burkina Faso BFA 21 18 7 30 26 45 19 16 20.246
Madagascar MDG 10 NA 50 25 41 12 27 13 21.550
Ethiopia ETH 11 21 29 35 17 46 29 10 21.913
Sudan SDN 28 31 35 47 9 NA 8 25 22.094
Kenya KEN 12 8 41 36 20 38 26 23 22.444
Sierra Leone SLE 23 25 30 7 44 21 33 18 22.525
Gambia GMB 9 38 14 22 32 41.5 23 22 22.711
Swaziland SWZ 39 27 3 42 28 26 25 35 23.220
Tanzania TZA 27 3 48 28 42 31 34 19 23.454
Cameroon CMR 15 16 39 9 30 40 38 24 23.474
Senegal SEN 19 13 26 33 21 37 18 32 23.557
Côte d’Ivoire CIV 22 14 32 19 49 9 46 27 23.789
Guinea GIN 29 36 34 8 36 18 35 17 23.984
Uganda UGA 26 11 31 17 37 39 43 12 24.058
Benin BEN 25 15 13 14 47 35.5 39 30 24.580
Tunisia TUN 40 37 42 45 1 28 47 43 25.115
Djibouti DJI 43 45 47 29 4 24.5 NA 34 26.336
Guinea Bissau GNB 33 43 19 13 45 34 41 14 27.292
Libya LBY 46 47 36 48 8 19 13 47 27.704
Nigeria NGA 14 24 28 27 31 41.5 40 28 27.889
Egypt EGY 38 42 46 49 2 48 28 41 28.169
Ghana GHA 37 19 25 23 40 22 44 29 28.650
South Africa ZAF 45 40 49 40 15 16 17 48 30.195
Algeria DZA 41 39 44 44 13 23 22 45 31.279
Morocco MAR 35 35 43 41 14 29 37 40 32.670
Table 2. Ranking results (n = 48 countries) based on the composite environmental performance index 
(ENVgm = geometric mean of the eight environmental component variable ranks). ISO = Alpha-3 country code; 
EF = ecological footprint48; MCI = megafauna conservation index49; THR = relative species threat (number of 
IUCN Red List species classified as Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, or Near Threatened divided 
by total number of species assessed; iucnredlist.org); FWR = freshwater removals (percent of internal resources; 
data.worldbank.org); FRL = recent (2000 to 2012) proportional forest loss50; LVS = livestock (cattle, pigs, 
buffaloes, sheep, and goats per hectare of arable land; fao.org/faostat); CPL = extent of permanent croplands 
(percent of total land area; data.worldbank.org); EMI = greenhouse-gas emissions (CO2-e per capita in 2013; 
data.worldbank.org).
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methods, spacing designs)56 allows people to regulate their reproduction, with well-established benefits for family 
welfare58, national economies58, and the environment54. For example, countries like Botswana, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe benefited from early adoption of population policies and family-planning programs56. One culprit 
for slow or stalled implementation elsewhere is that early deaths from the HIV/AIDS epidemic — while having 
limited demographic impact partly because of antiretroviral availability — have nonetheless shifted emphasis 
away from family planning54. It is therefore undeniable that African citizens and their governments would benefit 
from placing greater emphasis on quality family planning, a conclusion that we have also reached with respect to 
Africa’s environmental integrity54.
Some past investigations of the relationships between human population size/density and measures of envi-
ronmental status have been equivocal22–32,37 suggesting that issues of spatial and temporal scale, as well as the 
choice of environmental indicator, have bearing on the strength of evidence arising. At the national scale in 
Africa, human population density most likely reflects the current state of environmental performance because of 
the relative uniformity among the sample of nations regarding the timing of principal environmental change, as 
well as the rapid recent expansion of human populations in many countries in that region9,10. A fundamental tenet 
of population ecology is that per-capita resources decline as populations near carrying capacity59, so the absolute 
pressure on the environment is dictated more by variation in a country’s ‘carrying capacity’ than absolute popula-
tion size or per capita resource use per se37. Nonetheless, population density in the African context appears to be 
a reasonable reflection on average of an individual country’s proximity to this moving carrying-capacity target, 
despite localized improvements in biodiversity following fence construction60, for example.
Previous country rankings for environmental performance37 have not incorporated indices of leakage (exter-
nalizing environmental damage via pollution trading and outsourcing environmentally intensive production 
processes), although it is debatable whether it would make a large difference in the African context because of 
the relatively lower developed state of many of its nations compared to large consumers such as China, USA, 
and Brazil37. However, because we included each nation’s ecological footprint in our derivation of a composite 
environmental performance indicator, this should at least partially account for some aspects of leakage. Another 
potential caveat is that our modern ‘snapshot’ of the trends driving environmental degradation among African 
nations is likely to vary temporally, such that older comparisons could reveal alternate patterns. However, data 
for the variables we used to construct our analyses are largely unavailable and/or incomparable for periods vastly 
older than our current dataset.
It is unsurprising that per-capita wealth (GDP) had the hypothesised effect on a country’s relative environmen-
tal performance rank, especially considering that at the global scale at least, rising GDP reduces environmental 
performance among nations37. That same analysis37 also found no evidence to support the environmental Kuznets 
curve61 — the hypothesis that a U-shaped relationship exists between environmental degradation and per-capita 
wealth. This hypothesis predicts that beyond a certain threshold, wealthier societies begin to reduce their envi-
ronmental footprints. However, the evidence for the environmental Kuznets curve is equivocal62, depending 
on which metrics are measured, countries examined, and periods of development history61,63–70. Examining 
the bivariate plot between environmental performance rank and per-capita GDP rank (Fig. 3d) might suggest 
Figure 1. (a) Map of countries in Africa with background shading indicating approximate relative density 
of human populations (data from the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project GRUMP V1; http://sedac.ciesin.
columbia.edu/data/collection/grump-v1/methods). Each country (3-letter ISO country codes given in Table 2) 
is also shown with its approximate mid-2016 total human population size (Population Reference Bureau; www.
prb.org) in millions. (b) African countries shaded according to relative environmental performance (darker 
green indicates better relative environmental performance; see Table 2 for values).
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a U-shaped relationship; however, examined appropriately by partialling the effects of the other socio-economic 
variables using a boosted regression tree approach that can identify nonlinearities, there is no evidence of a 
U-shaped relationship (Supplementary Information Methods and Results Section 12, Fig. S6).
It is not clear why governance quality consistently emerges as a weak predictor of environmental perfor-
mance37. This conclusion exists even after using an African-specific indicator of governance quality71, possibly 
because governance problems in environmental custodianship might only become clear at finer spatial scales, 
perhaps only at regional or protected-area levels32. Alternatively, because governance quality tends to be ubiq-
uitously low across the African continent relative to elsewhere72, the low inter-country variation in this metric 
likely diminishes the power to identify a correlation with environmental performance. The weak, yet statistically 
Country ISO EF MCI THR FWR FRL LVS CPL EMI ENVgm
Cent Afr Rep CAF 18 5 1 2 25 44 11 6 7.754
Botswana BWA 44 1 4 31 10 7 1 42 7.955
Congo COG 20 20 9 1 27 2 14 31 9.790
Dem Rep Congo COD 3 33 23 5 43 10 21 2 10.943
Zambia ZMB 8 6 8 18 39 11 7 21 12.020
Chad TCD 31 23 11 26 19 13 5 3 12.876
Burundi BDI 2 22 22 21 24 43 45 1 13.240
Mozambique MOZ 5 10 38 12 46 4 20 15 13.724
Angola AGO 6 17 12 10 38 7 15 39 14.454
Mali MLI 30 29 5 34 16 30 10 5 15.623
Zimbabwe ZWE 17 4 6 39 29 17 16 36 16.102
Rwanda RWA 7 7 21 16 22 47 42 7 16.309
Niger NER 32 26 15 38 6 24.5 9 9 16.557
Somalia SOM 24 44 40 43 11 20 6 4 17.690
Lesotho LSO 34 32 16 11 4 32 12 37 17.972
Malawi MWI 4 9 37 32 33 35.5 30 8 18.190
Mauritania MRT 42 46 27 46 7 15 2 33 18.950
Togo TGO 13 12 10 15 35 33 36 26 19.970
Liberia LBR 16 41 33 3 48 14 31 20 20.139
Burkina Faso BFA 21 18 7 30 26 45 19 16 20.246
Ethiopia ETH 11 21 29 35 17 46 29 10 21.913
Kenya KEN 12 8 41 36 20 38 26 23 22.444
Sierra Leone SLE 23 25 30 7 44 21 33 18 22.525
Gambia GMB 9 38 14 22 32 41.5 23 22 22.711
Swaziland SWZ 39 27 3 42 28 26 25 35 23.220
Tanzania TZA 27 3 48 28 42 31 34 19 23.454
Cameroon CMR 15 16 39 9 30 40 38 24 23.474
Senegal SEN 19 13 26 33 21 37 18 32 23.557
Côte d’Ivoire CIV 22 14 32 19 49 9 46 27 23.789
Guinea GIN 29 36 34 8 36 18 35 17 23.984
Uganda UGA 26 11 31 17 37 39 43 12 24.058
Benin BEN 25 15 13 14 47 35.5 39 30 24.580
Tunisia TUN 40 37 42 45 1 28 47 43 25.115
Guinea Bissau GNB 33 43 19 13 45 34 41 14 27.292
Libya LBY 46 47 36 48 8 19 13 47 27.704
Nigeria NGA 14 24 28 27 31 41.5 40 28 27.889
Egypt EGY 38 42 46 49 2 48 28 41 28.169
Ghana GHA 37 19 25 23 40 22 44 29 28.650
South Africa ZAF 45 40 49 40 15 16 17 48 30.195
Algeria DZA 41 39 44 44 13 23 22 45 31.279
Morocco MAR 35 35 43 41 14 29 37 40 32.670
Table 3. Ranking results (mandating that all environmental indices be available to calculate the composite 
environmental index; n = 41 countries). ISO = Alpha-3 country code; EF = ecological footprint48; 
MCI = megafauna conservation index49; THR = relative species threat (number of IUCN Red List species 
classified as Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, or Near Threatened divided by total number of 
species assessed; iucnredlist.org); FWR = freshwater removals (percent of internal resources; data.worldbank.
org); FRL = recent (2000 to 2012) proportional forest loss50; LVS = livestock (cattle, pigs, buffaloes, sheep, and 
goats per hectare of arable land; fao.org/faostat); CPL = extent of permanent croplands (percent of total land 
area; data.worldbank.org); EMI = greenhouse-gas emissions (CO2-e per capita in 2013; data.worldbank.org).
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supported relationship between environmental rank and wealth disparity was as predicted — increasing wealth 
disparity leads to better environmental performance. This relationship might seem counter-intuitive, but there is 
evidence that when democratic processes are restricted, a less equal income distribution generates less environ-
mental degradation73,74. The observed relationship most likely arises because greater inequality in wealth among 
citizens likely engenders fewer opportunities for development of natural resources, thus hindering or at least 
delaying environmental damage45.
In conclusion, our results strongly support the idea that a sustainable approach to biodiversity conservation 
in Africa over the coming decades cannot be limited by a narrow perspective that treats different development 
goals of well-being and environmental custodianship as separate entities if they ignore issues of sustained human 
population growth52. Indeed, with the mounting pressures facing Africa’s ecological systems, continued environ-
mental degradation will impose further negative feedbacks on human well-being, because human quality of life 
is fundamentally tied to the healthy functioning of ecosystems52. Of course, better education, poverty allevia-
tion, technological advances, and participation in multilateral environmental agreements could restrict land-use 
change and consumption rates and patterns; however, while there are many policy levers that African nations can 
use to improve the future state of their environments and the societies that depend on them, limiting excessive 
human population growth will, on average, likely facilitate better environmental custodianship.
Methods
environmental data. Our goal was to define an African-relevant composite environmental indicator rank 
for each nation on the continent. While there are many ways to measure a nation’s environmental performance, 
there are more regionally and temporally relevant measures that attest to the specific environmental histories of 
regions. We therefore reasoned that given the recent colonial history of many African nations, the recent spike in 
human population sizes, rapid development investment over the last few decades, a rich diversity of megafauna 
under substantial threat from agricultural expansion and poaching39, and an emphasis on primary production 
Figure 2. (a) Top-ranked structural equation model (in Table 3) where a nation’s environmental performance 
rank (ENV; low rank = best relative environmental performance) is positively correlated with population 
density (POPD), and negatively correlated with gross domestic product (GDP, corrected for purchasing-power 
parity), and Gini wealth inequality index (GINI). Numbers on the directional pathways indicate standardized 
coefficients for each relationship. (b) There is also some modest evidence for a positive effect of proportion of 
land area under protection (PROT) (see third-ranked model in Table 3). One-way and two-way correlations 
among predictor variables also shown. POGR = population growth rate.
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(cropping, livestock husbandry), that the following available indicators would be ideal to construct a composite 
environmental index for African nations: ecological footprint (footprintnetwork.org), megafauna conservation 
index49, IUCN Red List species threat (iucnredlist.org), freshwater removal (data.worldbank.org), forest loss50,75, 
livestock density (fao.org/faostat), cropland extent (data.worldbank.org), and greenhouse-gas emissions (data.
worldbank.org). We provide a full description of each indicator in the Supplementary Information (Section 1).
Combined environmental performance indicator. For each environmental variable, we made simple 
hierarchical rankings (i.e., we did not consider the magnitude of the differences among absolute values between 
countries to avoid issues related to heteroscedasticity, non-linearity, and non-Gaussian distributions) using the 
rank function (means averaged) in R76. To construct a mean rank across all seven variables, we calculated geomet-
ric mean rankings for countries37 where at least seven of the eight variables were available to provide a measure 
of relative distance between countries in the final composite rank. We argue that a ‘seven out of eight’ criterion 
maximizes sample size (number of countries) without compromising the meaningfulness of the combined index 
(see Tables 3 and 5 for a sensitivity analysis of this choice). This ranking approach also avoids the undue influence 
of outliers (i.e., analogous to a geometric mean)77:
=
∑
=geometric mean rank 10
x
k
log (rank( ))
i
k i
1
10
where xi = environmental metric i (for k metrics considered).
Figure 3. Bivariate rank relationships between (a) population density, (b) proportion of land area under 
protection, (c) Gini wealth distribution index, and (d) per capita GDP and relative environmental performance 
rank among African nations. Three-letter ISO country codes (point labels) are given in Table 2.
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socio-economic data. For a detailed description of the socio-economic variables and associated hypoth-
eses, see Supplementary Information Section 2. In summary, we accessed the World Bank database for the esti-
mated human population size for African nations in 2015, dividing this value by total land area per country to 
calculate a human population density (data.worldbank.org). We hypothesized that increasing human density 
would lead to greater pressure on environmental resources25, thus lowering a country’s environmental perfor-
mance rank. We also calculated the mean annual human population growth rate from 1960 to 2015 for African 
nations from the World Bank (data.worldbank.org), hypothesizing that faster mean population growth would 
hasten the exploitation of a country’s resources relative to slower-growing nations25.
Also from the World Bank, we accessed each country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (corrected 
for purchasing-power parity) as an index of total wealth. Some countries were missing GDP estimates for certain 
model df χ2 ΔBIC wBIC NCI IFI
POPD + GDP + GINI 12 8.094 — 0.486 1.053 1.089
POPD + GDP 13 12.903 1.171 0.271 1.001 1.002
POPD + GDP + GINI + PROT 11 7.956 3.500 0.085 1.041 1.068
POPD + GDP + GINI + GOV 11 8.094 3.637 0.079 1.039 1.065
POPD 14 19.775 4.405 0.054 0.927 0.862
POPD + PROT 13 19.333 7.601 0.011 0.920 0.853
POPD + GOV 13 19.350 7.618 0.011 0.920 0.852
ALL 9 7.070 9.889 0.003 1.026 1.041
GINI 14 32.840 17.470 <0.001 0.780 0.551
GOV 14 33.334 17.965 <0.001 0.775 0.540
GDP 14 34.497 19.128 <0.001 0.764 0.512
PROT 14 34.782 19.412 <0.001 0.761 0.505
POPG 14 34.807 19.437 <0.001 0.761 0.505
Table 4. Structural equation models considered in the model set correlating socio-economic variables to 
the composite geometric mean environmental ranking among countries (n = 38). See Fig. 2 for a schematic 
of variable paths for the All model (including all variables). POPD = human population density; GDP = per 
capita gross domestic product (corrected for purchasing power parity); GINI = Gini wealth distribution 
index; PROT = proportion of land under some protection; ALL = model including all predictor variables; 
GOV = governance quality; POPG = human population growth rate. Values in the table refer to: df = degrees 
of freedom; χ2 = chi-square; ΔBIC = difference in Bayesian information criterion of the top-ranked model and 
the model in question; wBIC = BIC model weight; NCI = McDonald’s non-centrality index (goodness-of-fit); 
IFI = Bollen’s incremental fit index (goodness-of-fit). All models with high goodness-of-fit (NCI and IFI > 0.9) 
in boldface.
model df χ2 ΔBIC wBIC NCI IFI
POPD + GDP 13 12.595 — 0.432 1.006 1.011
POPD + GDP + GINI 12 9.526 0.458 0.344 1.037 1.067
POPD 14 20.029 3.908 0.061 0.915 0.829
POPD + GDP + GINI + GOV 11 9.452 3.910 0.061 1.023 1.041
POPD + GDP + GINI + PROT 11 9.487 3.944 0.060 1.023 1.040
POPD + GOV 13 18.379 5.784 0.024 0.924 0.851
POPD + PROT 13 20.027 7.432 0.011 0.902 0.806
ALL 9 7.089 8.599 0.006 1.029 1.048
GOV 14 28.801 12.680 0.001 0.804 0.579
GDP 14 30.577 14.456 <0.001 0.784 0.529
GINI 14 31.982 15.861 <0.001 0.768 0.489
POPG 14 32.028 15.907 <0.001 0.767 0.487
PROT 14 33.271 17.150 <0.001 0.753 0.452
Table 5. Structural equation models considered in the model set correlating socio-economic variables 
to the composite geometric mean environmental ranking among countries (n = 34; reduced set of 
countries from Table 3). POPD = human population density; GDP = per capita gross domestic product 
(corrected for purchasing power parity); GINI = Gini wealth distribution index; PROT = proportion of 
land under some protection; ALL = model including all predictor variables; GOV = governance quality; 
POPG = human population growth rate. Values in the table refer to: df = degrees of freedom; χ2 = chi-square; 
ΔBIC = difference in Bayesian information criterion of the top-ranked model and the model in question; 
wBIC = BIC model weight83; NCI = McDonald’s non-centrality index80 (goodness-of-fit); IFI = Bollen’s 
incremental fit index81 (goodness-of-fit). All models with NCI and IFI > 0.9 in boldface.
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years, so we took the mean of values from 2011–2015 as an indication of mean per-capita GDP to maximize the 
sample size of countries considered. Previously, we showed that a country’s total wealth leads to a lower environ-
mental performance (i.e., more degradation)37. Also from the World Bank, we accessed an index of wealth distri-
bution using the Gini index from 2005 to 2014 (again, taking the mean of values across this period to maximize 
sample size). We hypothesized that the greater a country’s inequality in wealth across its citizenry, the lower the 
environmental damage that would ensue due to higher poverty and less overall development45.
We also hypothesized that poorer overall governance would lead to higher likelihood of environmental 
exploitation based on previous work linking it to environmental degradation46,47 (although at a global scale, 
declining governance quality had little impact on national-scale environmental performance)37. We used the 
Overall Governance Score from the 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance71, which includes measures of 
safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human develop-
ment indicators in its normalized overall score.
Finally, we hypothesized that a country’s commitment to protecting its native species, expressed through 
the proportion of its total land area under some form of protection, would lead to great environmental perfor-
mance33. However, it is not part of the composite environmental performance indicator because the amount or 
number of protected areas does not necessarily translate into lower extinction rates33. To this end, we accessed the 
percentage of land under protected-area status for each country from the Population Reference Bureau (pbr.org), 
which is originally sourced from the World Database of Protected Areas (protectedplanet.net).
Structural equation models. To account for inter-correlations among hypothesized socio-economic 
explanatory variables37, we applied structural (path) equation models to model the hypothesized relationships78. 
We constructed thirteen candidate models (see Results Table 3) to examine the socio-economic drivers of envi-
ronmental rank among African countries, keeping the hypothesized relationships between socio-economic var-
iables constant in all. These were: (a) a two-way correlation between human population density and growth rate, 
based on the assumption that compensatory density feedbacks operated between these two population variables; 
(b) a two-way correlation between governance score and per-capita GDP; (c) a two-way correlation between 
per-capita GDP and wealth distribution; (d) a one-way correlation between population density and per capita 
GDP; and (e) a one-way correlation between governance quality and the proportion of the landscape under some 
form of protection (see Results for schematic). Prior to fitting, we investigated the non-parametric ordinal rank 
correlations using Kendall’s τ because we used ranks in all models. We fitted the candidate path models to the 
data using the sem function79 implemented in the R Package76, calculating Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
weights to assign relative strength of evidence to each model in the set. We evaluated the goodness-of-fit of each 
model using McDonald’s non-centrality index80 and Bollen’s incremental fit index81 using the semGOF library 
in R, both of which should be >0.90 to consider a model’s fit to be acceptable81. We also considered structural 
equation models using single environmental indicators to examine which elements of environmental change were 
most influenced by variation in socio-economic conditions (Supplementary Information Methods and Results 
Section 8, Table S10). We also considered only the ‘biodiversity’ components (i.e., megafauna conservation index49, 
IUCN Red List species threat, and forest loss50,75) to create a second composite environmental rank to determine its 
relationship to the socio-economic correlates in isolation from the other ‘agricultural’ (freshwater removal, live-
stock density, and cropland extent) and economic (ecological footprint, and greenhouse-gas emissions) components 
of the environmental performance rank (Supplementary Information Methods and Results Section 9, Table S11). 
We also considered a country’s poverty gap (percentage of people below the relevant country’s poverty thresh-
old — data from the World Bank) instead of the Gini index as a measure of wealth inequality (Supplementary 
Information Methods and Results Section 10, Table S12). These models included fewer countries (34), had gener-
ally poorer fits, but supported the dominance of population density as the most important correlate (Table S12).
Boosted regression trees. Finally, we considered the absolute differences between the values compris-
ing the environmental performance metric, as well as those between the predictor values (cf. ranks) to examine 
whether ranking — despite its advantages for avoiding unequal variances, non-linearities, and non-Gaussian 
behaviour — resulted in substantially different conclusions. We therefore used the same data that we obtained 
to derive the rankings, but instead scaled and centred the data for each composite environmental metric, and 
then took the median value to derive a new, continuous-variable environmental-performance metric. Next, we 
scaled and centred the socio-economic predictor variables in the same manner, and then tested for relation-
ships as we did for the ranked data. However, even scaling and centring could not remove potential problems of 
non-Gaussian distributions (Supplementary Information Methods and Results Section 11, Figs S2–S4), so we 
employed boosted regression trees82 instead to test the relationships (Supplementary Information Methods and 
Results Section 11, Fig. S5).
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